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LONG ARTICLES

DISCERNING INDIA'S EVOLVING CONCEPTION
OF TAXABLE INCOME - AN INTERDISCIPLINARY
PERSPECTIVE
Gouri Pur*

ABSTRACT
This essay focuses on the conception of taxable income in India and
argues that there is a disconnect between the policy of tax laws and their
judicial interpretation.The author takes an inter-disciplinaryapproach
to explain that the taxation laws in India are predominantlypremised on
the net accretion concept of taxable income whereas the Indian judiciary
has consistently inclined towards the 'source' based definition of income.
The paperfurther discusses the impact of each approachon the building of
taxation jurisprudence in India. It concludes with the argument that the
disengagement between the judiciary'sperception, the taxation policy and
legislation has resulted in an incoherent understandingof the concept of
'taxable income' in India.
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I. INTRODUCTION

In 2009, the Government of India released the Direct Taxes Code Bill (later
substituted by the Direct Taxes Code Bill, 2010). While the provisions of the
new code attracted debate and scholarship from the legal community, the code's
adoption of a "comprehensive conception" of income received little attention. This
is surprising, given that the conception of income is the foundation of an income
tax. However, a perusal of prior legal scholarship reveals ambiguity and scant
deliberation surrounding the subject. Kanga, Palkhivala and Vyas' investigation
of India's tax jurisprudence concluded that there is no logical explanation of
"income" under India's income tax law.1 In his paper Income or Capital in 1970,
Bagchi concurred with this.2 A shortcoming of the existing tax scholarship is that
it approaches the subject from either an exclusively legal or an exclusively policybased perspective.
1

2

Kanga et al, The Law and Practice of Income Tax - , 202. [Hereinafter, "Kanga"I The
authors observe: "The categories of income are never closed. It would be impossible
to define income precisely...anything which can properly be described as income is
taxable under the Act unless expressly exempted. That perhaps is the best definition
of taxable income, from the practical though not from the logical point of view".
A. Bagchi, Income or Capital?, 5 Economic and Political Weekly 1781-1787 (1970).
[Hereinafter, "Bagchi"] "'What is income?' was thus left to be decided on the facts of
each case in the light of ideas rooted in pre suppositions and prejudices and not with
reference to any conceptual framework. "Indeed in many cases" (involving the matter
of "Income or Capital") a BritishJudge confessed, "it is almost true to say that the spin
of a coin would decide the matter as satisfactorily as an attempt to find reasons".
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This paper adopts an interdisciplinary approach to achieve clarity about the
concept of income under Indian income tax law. It considers in detail how each
of the two prominent economic conceptions of income, source and net accretion,
is articulated within India's income tax law and jurisprudence. Consequently, it
theorizes the following: India's judicial conception of taxable income has been
inspired by the source view of income. However, India's tax policy and statutes
have been in transition toward the net accretion view of taxable income. This
paper attributes the incoherence in India's conception of taxable income to the
growing disconnect between the fiscal policy's view and the judiciary's view of
taxable income.

11. CONCEPTIONS OF TAXABLE INCOME
This section of the paper introduces the two prominent conceptions of
"taxable income" that underlie fiscal systems: source and net accretion. It briefly
discusses the characteristics of these two paradigms which are crucial to an analysis
of India's conception of taxable income.
A. Source Conception of Taxable Income
The source conception of income was a product of the British "political
economy" in the eighteenth and nineteenth centuries.3 Britain was predominantly
an agricultural society, and its view of income was inspired by the harvest cycle.4
K. Holmes explains it as follows:
"Income was viewed as a physical product; an annual harvest, or the cash
into which the harvest could be converted Income in this sense recurred
regularlywith the passageof seasons. Such income was related to the capital
that produced it. The harvest arose out offarming, which took place on the
land. Land on the other hand was a physical and continuingsource of annual
harvest. The harvest was separablefrom the source and was availablefor
unconstraineddisposal or consumption without impairingthe underlying
capital." 5
From the harvest cycle emanated the perception of income as a flow from
capital and land which produced the income stream, and signified capital in the
3
4
5

K. Holmes, The Concept of Income: A multi disciplinary analysis, 174 (2001).
[Hereinafter, "K.Holmes"]
174, K.Holmes.
174, K.Holmes.
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physical sense.6 The gains on the disposal of land were not viewed as income. Some
scholars attribute this to the infrequent changes of ownership in land,7 while others
advocate alternative reasoning based on the political clout of landed interests. 8
This distinction between income and capital was further grounded in the institution of trusts. Richardson comments:
"Income Tax was introduced in Britain in 1799 and was developed in the
191 cen ury.. .At that time the United Kingdom had a developed agricultural
economy and a developing industrialsociety.... Ingrained in English legal
thinkingaffecting both the politicalestablishmentand the judiciarywas the
use of trusts and the succession of property."'
Landowners sought to bequeath their estate to their heirs, without giving
the latter the power to dispose of the same.
"Tus, the estates were to be retained within a genealogicallineage where
an estate was held in trustfor each succeeding heir,who was entitled only
to the incomefrom the estate during his lifetime. An heir was not entitled
to the capital of the estate, increases of which, during the heir's lifetime,
were accumulated in the estate and passed on to successors. Consequently,
a distinction arose between income, which could be consumed by the life
tenant, and capital, which was to pass to remainderman."10
The courts transposed this distinction in trust law into their understanding
of income."
Finally, a word must be said about Britain's classical economists' approach
to understanding income and the scheduler mechanism of taxation. Consider the
following paragraph from S. Utz's Ability to Pay and notice the suggested nexus
between scheduler taxation and the view that taxable income arises from the
factors of production:
"Britainfollowed a scheduler system of taxation wherein the income tax laws
relied on the device of requiring taxpayers to report income in accordance
6
7
8
9
10
11

174, K. Holmes.
174, K. Holmes.
S. Utz, Ability to Pay, 23 Whittier Law Review 867,904 -905 (2002). [Hereinafter, "S.
Utz")
I.LM Richardson, The Concept of Income and Tax Policy, 4 Canterbury Law Review 203
(1990) cf K.Holmes at 190.
174, K.Holmes.
174, K.Holmes.
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with scheduledactivities orfrom scheduled sources,which apparentlymade
sense to the British, because British classical economists had so successfully
sold their public on the inevitability of the macroeconomic model that
distinguished land, capital and labour as ultimately distinct sources of
new wealth".12
Thus, British classical economists placed emphasis on functional rather than
"personal" distribution.13
This historical outline provides a contextual introduction to the characteristics
of the source conception of income. 4 The hallmark of the source conception of
income is the distinction made between income and capital. This distinction is
analogous to the distinction between the tree and its fruit.
The source is generally linked to capital, in its physical sense. The flows that
capital produces are regarded as income and are subject to tax. Any accretion in
capital value is not taxed.
B. OtherAmplifications of the Concept of Income
As R.F. Plasschaert observes, the source conception was often seen in
combination with other amplifications of the concept of income. 1' The most
important of these was periodicity, which envisaged income as a recurrent flow. 6
Economists have expressed a distinction between regularity and recurrence."
"Receipts may, and often do, fluctuate in an irregular pattern of recurrence." 8
While regularity may suggest that a receipt may not fluctuate, recurrence merely
demands the "possibility of future successive wealth." 9
Furthermore, the understanding of income as a flow led to the development of
a legal concept divorced from the idea of economic gain. The simplest illustration
12 S. Utz.
13 P.Wueller, The Concept of Taxable Income- L 53 Political Science Quarterly 83,85 (1938).
14
15
16
17
18
19

20

[Hereinafter, "P. Wueller" ]
For a more detailed history, See P. Harris, Income Tax in Common Law Jurisdictions,1
Cambridge Tax Law Series (2006).
S.R.F. Plasschaert, Schedular, Global and Dualistic Patterns of Income Taxation, 43-55
(1998). [Hereinafter, "R.F. Plasschaert"]
85, P. Wueller; See also 99, K. Holmes.
85, P. Wueler; See also 99, K. Holmes.
100, K Holmes.
85, P. Wueller. Periodicity seems to be inspired by Britain's harvest cycle and the life
entitlement of the beneficiary of the trust.

379, K. Holmes.
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was the purchase of an annuity for a lump sum. The entire annual receipt was held
taxable though a part of it represented recovery of the initial investment. As such,
the fiscal system followed a "net income" concept. However, the idea of income as
an inflow hindered the courts from noticing the corresponding diminution in the
value of the asset that produced the inflow. K. Holmes referred to this phenomenon
as the taxation of "illusory gains."2"
Productivity was another test for qualification as income. The receipt should
have arisen from an economic activity undertaken by the recipient of incomen
Noticeably, Britain's scheduler approach to taxation bears semblance to the
productivity criterion.
Further, the British courts saw only cash receipts or receipts convertible into
cash as income, much like the harvest produce.? K. Holmes notes that the courts'
view was often guided by an ordinary man's perception of income?'
This view of income was not limited to Britain. Literature suggests that it
was adopted by many countries and economists of continental Europe. However,
since India was a former colony of Britain, this paper draws on the British version
of the source conception of income, including the already mentioned amplifications
of this.
C. Net Accretion Conception of Taxable Income
Schanz, Haigs and Simons are recognized as the first proponents of the net
accretion approach taincome. 26 These economists each had a background in fiscal
policy; each was interested in developing a "fiscally useful concept of income"
embedded in the ideals of equity or the "ability to pay" principle.2 Thus, the net
accretion approach was a product of systemized study by economists. This is not
to discount the plausible influence of the political and economic factors on their
views of income. Whatever the primary influence, the essence of their perception
of income was "ability to pay."
21

27

379, K. Holmes.
85, P. Wueller.
Tenant v. Smith, 1892 AC 150,156 (House of Lords).
233, K.Holmes.
85, P. Wueller.
P. Wueller, Concepts ofTaxable Income- 1I, 53 Political Science Quarterly 557-583 (1938).
[Hereinafter, "P. Wueller II"]
557-583, P. Wueller II.

28

557-583, P. Wueller II.

22

23
24
25
26
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Schanz defined income as "net inflow of economic ability over a given period
of time."2 ' However, he gave no indication as to the measure of the economic
ability3
Next, R.M. Haig conceptualized income as "the money value of the net
accretion to one's economic power between two points in time."31 According to
him, the economic power of an individual was his power to satisfy his wants. He
further defined income as "the increase or accretion to one's power to satisfy his
wants in a given period so far as that power consists of (a) money itself, or, (b)
anything susceptible of valuation in terms of money."4
I

Under R.M. Haig's definition, income, in addition to cash receipts, would
include the following. First,the receipt of any goods or services obtained in kind
which can be valued in terms of moneyA3 and which would indeed satisfy wants.
Second, accretion in the value of assets, whether realized or not. Like cash receipts,
these accretions empower the individual to fulfill his wants. Tird, the value of
benefits obtained from non-market transactions, often referred to as imputed
income.3 For instance, the benefit derived from living in one's own house. This
benefit represents the satisfaction of a want equivalent to that of a person who
rents a house.3
This takes us to H.C. Simon's definition of personal income. He viewed
income as:
"7Te algebraicsum of(i) the market value of rightsexercised in consumption
and (ii) the change in the value of the store of other property rights between
the beginning and the end of the period in question." 3
H.C. Simon's conception is similar to that of R.M. Haig's. Yet, while the latter
measures the economic power at the stage of its accrual, the former measures the
29

30
31
32
33
34
35
36

G.V. Schanz, Der Einkommensbergiffunddie Einkommensteurergestze,FanAzARciv 1-30

(1896) as translated in 85, P.Wueller.
233, K. Holmes.
R.M. Haig, The ConceptofIncome - Economicand LegalAspects, Tis FEDEVAL INCOME TAX
(R.M. Haig ed., 1921), as quoted in 174, K. Holmes. [Hereinafter, "R.M. Haig")
R.M. Haig.
R.M. Haig.
R.M. Haig.
R.M. Haig.
H.C. Simons, PersonalIncome Taxation - The Deftnition of Income as a Problem of Fiscal
Policy, 42 UNIVESIT oF CHIcAGo PRESS (1938), as quoted in 174, K. Holmes.
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increase in a person's economic power by looking at its disposition (at the stage
of its exercise either for consumption or savings after such expenditure),7 For our
purposes we shall follow R.M. Haig's approach to measuring income.
It is noteworthy that a complete implementation of the net accretion
conception is difficult to achieve. For instance, the United States would like to
apply such principles but is prevented from doing so by administrative hurdles
Problems arise especially in the valuation of imputed income and accretions to the
value of assets where such gains have not been realized." Consequently, imputed
income remains untaxed and taxes on accretion to the value of assets are paid
m 0 Thus, the net accretion conception has practical drawbacks.
upon realization.
Nonetheless, present-day literature regards it as the most suitable conception of
income for the imposition of an income tax.
D. Divergence between Source and Net Accretion
This paper does not endeavor to reach a conclusion about which of the
foregoing conceptions is superior from a tax policy perspective. Indeed, ample
scholarship exists that evaluates the relative merits and drawbacks of these
conceptions.4 Instead, this paper evaluates how the adoption of either conception
bears on the law and its interpretation. This paper hypothesizes that the Indian
fiscal system is in transition from the source conception to the net accretion
conception. Therefore, it becomes important to gain an understanding of where
these conceptions diverge. R.A. Musgrave's elaboration on the net accretion
approach assists in understanding this divergence:
"According to this definition (net accretion), income equals gain in net
worth plus consumption duringa given period. What matters is total income
thus defined. No distinction is to be made between either sources or uses
of income. Gains may be factor earnings (e.g., wages, interest, and rent) in
the economist's sense, or they may be mere transfers (e.g., gifts or gambling
gains); they may be expected or unexpected, irregularor regular,accrued or
realized,from business or accident, and so on and so forth. All that matters
is that there exists a gain which gives rise to consumption or to increase in
net worth. Similarly, it is left to the recipientwhether he wishes to use his
37
38
39
40
41

233, K. Holmes.
MJ. Graetz, and D.H. Schenk, Federal Income Taxation: Principles and Policies (6th
edn., 2009). [Hereinafter, "Graetz"]
Graetz.
Graetz.
174, K. Holmes. See also 557-583, P. Wueller II.
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gain for one or another type of present consumption, or whether he wishes
to postpone consumption and save" 4
These theoretical observations can be transposed to "actual receipts" that
would be affected by this divergence.
First, receipts arisingfrom transfers do not qualify as income under the source
conception of income on account of the criteria of periodicity, productivity and
the income-capital distinction. However, the gains embedded in these receipts are
certainly income under the net accretion approach. Even an unrealized accretion
to the value of assets is income under the latter approach."
Second, windfalls such as lottery, gambling winnings and life insurance
receipts are not taxed under the source conception because they fail the periodicity
and productivity criteria. Yet, under the net accretion conception they represent
an economic gain and are therefore taxable."
Third, benefits that are not convertible into money, for instance, rent-free
accommodation (that cannot be sublet) provided by an employer are not income
under the British conception. However, under the net accretion approach, such a
benefit satisfies want and is taxable if it can be valued in terms of money. s
Fourth, benefits derived from non-market transactions (imputed income) are not
income under the source view. This is because there is no receipt or an incoming;
leaving aside their convertibility into money. On the other hand, the net accretion
approach measures the increase in economic power with an increase in the
satisfaction of wants. Therefore, as long as imputed income can be valued in terms
of money, it is taxable."
Fifth, the conceptions diverge on annuity receipts. Under the source
conception, income is perceived as a flow from a source as opposed to an economic
gain. Despite the fact that a part of an annuity receipt is merely a return of the
original investment, the entire annuity receipt is considered as income and is
taxable. On the contrary, under net accretion, only the gain in excess of the amount
invested is taxed from an annuity receipt.47
42

R.A. Musgrave, In Defense of an Income Concept, 18

(1967).
43 379, K. Holmes.
44 164 and 166, K.Holmes.
45 160, K.Holmes.
46 158, K.Holmes.
47 363, K. Holmes.

HARVARD LAW

Review 44-62
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These five receipts are treated differently under the two conceptions of
income. The differences in these conceptions may have a bearing on certain other
receipts. However, we shall confine discussion to these five receipts and, in the
following sections, analyze the bearing they have on Indian income tax law.

III. INDIA'S CONCEPTION OF TAXABLE INCOME
This section of the paper chronologically charts India's changing conception
of taxable income, within the framework of the two paradigms discussed in the
previous part: source and net accretion. For several years, tax scholarship in India
has critiqued the ambiguous conception of income underlying the Indian income
tax system." Studying India's conception within these paradigms helps to pinpoint
the cause for this incoherence. To do so, the paper looks at India's fiscal policy,
legislation and judicial decisions.
A. EstablishingIndia'sConception of Income -Judiciary takes the lead
The Income Tax Act, 192249 [Hereinafter, "the Act") was enacted during the
British Rule in India. Consequently, there is a presumption that the Act adopted
the British conception of income. To ascertain this, we peruse the relevant
provisions.
The Act did not originally contain a definition of income. Unlike the British
law, it followed a global system of income taxation.50 However, it contained a
provision enumerating the "sources of income." These sources resembled the
schedules of the British income tax law and the four factors of production. The
provision reads as follows. s
"Save as otherwiseprovided by this Act, thefollowing heads of income, profits
and gains shall be chargeable to income tax - in the manner hereinafter
appearingnamely:
48
49

202, Kanga; 1781-1787, Bagchi.
The Income Tax Act was first imposed in India in 1860. Ascheduler system of taxation
was adopted in 1886. Subsequently the 1918 Act introduced the global system of
taxation. See O.P. Chawla, Personal Taxation in India 1947 - 1970, 39-47 (1972).

50

51
52

[Hereinafter, "OP. Chawla"]
The scheduler income tax system is one where, "each of the various categories of
income, or (partial) incomes.. .flowing to the same taxpayer, is subjected to a separate
tax rate." A global income tax isone where, "all incomes, from whatever source derived,
accruing to the same taxpayer, are treated as a single mass of income and subjected to
a single rate formula." See 17, R.F. Plasschaert.
§ 6, The Income Tax Act, 1922.
§ 6 was initially interpreted in Probhat v. Emperor, AIR 1924 Cal 668 [Calcutta High
Court] to be the charging section. Later, the Supreme Court departed from this position
and held that the provision merely classified income.
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(ii)

Intereston Securities
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(iii) Incomefrom Property
(iv) Profits and gains of business, profession or vocation
(v)

Incomefrom other sources"

As such, there was no specific head for gains arising from the transfer of
assets. Yet, that did not preclude taxing those gains under income from property,
business, or employment or, in any case, under the head of income from other
sources.
Thus, the Act followed a global method of taxation and made a provision
that enumerated sources reminiscent of the British schedules.

Further, § 4 (3) (vii)S3 of the Act excluded casualM and non-recurring receipts
not arising in the course of business or profession from total income. Similarly, §
4 (3) (v) excluded capital sums received in commutation of pension income or in
payment of insurance policies." These exclusions could signify the use of a statute
to relieve items that would otherwise be income. Alternatively, the provision could
be a restatement of the "conception of taxable income," giving statutory effect to
the aiteria of periodicity, productivity and the income-capital distinction. Either
way, § 4 had the effect of exempting gains arising from transfers and windfalls.
These exclusions were characteristic of the source conception of income.
At one instance, the Act provided for the taxation of imputed income, where
rental income was imputed to an owner occupying her building. Furthermore,
53

54

55

56

57

§ 4 (3) (vii), The Income Tax Act, 1922: "Any receipts not being receipts arising from
business or the exercise of profession, vocation or occupation, which are of a casual
and non-recurring nature or are not by way of addition to the remuneration of an
employee.".
Casual has been defined by the courts to mean "subject to or produced by chance,
accidental, fortuitous". See Cossimbazar v. Commissioner of Income Tax, 1946 14 ITh
377 Cal, 395 [Calcutta High Court].
Some courts construed non-recurrence to imply the impossibility of recurrence See
In Re: Chunnilal Kalyandas, [1924) 1 ITC 419 (All) [Allahabad High Court]. Others
interpreted the term to mean that there is no claim or right in the recipient to expect
its recurrence See Amrit Kunwar v. Commissioner of Income Tax, 194614 ITR561, 591
[Allahabad High Court] [Hereinafter, "Amrit Kunwar"] as quoted in 446, Kanga.
§ 4 (3) (v), The Income Tax Act, 1922: "Any capital sum received in commutation of
the whole or a portion of a pension, or in the nature of consolidated compensation for
death or injuries, or in payment of any insurance policy, or as the accumulated balance
at the credit of a subscriber to any such provident fund."
§ 9, The Income Tax Act, 1922.
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in 1923, the Act was amended to tax rent-free accommodation provided by an
employer to his employee, as the latter's salary income. This was despite the fact
that the employee could not sublet the accommodation and convert the benefit
into money. These provisions departed from the British conception of source.
Against this legislative backdrop, the Privy Council rendered a decision on
the meaning of "income" in Shaw Wallace v. Union of India.5 The issue was whether
receipts received in lieu of cessation of an agency could constitute income. The
Court held that these receipts were not income and noted:
"Income .., in this Act connotes a periodical monetary return 'coming in'
with some sort of regularity, or expected regularity,from definite sources.
The source is not one which is expected to be continuously productive, but
it must be one whose object is the production of a definite return, excluding
anything in the nature of a mere windfall. Thus income has been likened
pictoriallyto thefruit of a tree, or crop of afield. It is essentially the produce
of something which is often loosely spoken of as 'capital'.But capital,though
possible the source in the case of income from securities, is in most cases
hardly more than an element in the process of production." 9
This decision was the beginning of the judicial conception of income. The
Court did not cite any policy statement supporting its viewP Further, the only
statute quoted was § 6 of the Act. According to the Court, "it enumerated the
sources from which taxable income could be derived under the Act. " ' Inferably,
the court was importing Britain's scheduler philosophy of income vide § 6 of the
Act.
Furthermore, it clarified that receipts received in lieu of cessation of an
agency had not arisen under the head of income from business 2This was because
"the head" contemplated the continuation of business." Since the receipt arose to
substitute the source itself, it was not income." The Revenue argued for a broader
conception of taxable income. It drew support from § 4 (3). As seen, the provision
excluded casual and recurrent receipts and certain capital sums from the definition

58
59
60
61
62
63
64

Commissioner of Income Tax v. Shaw Wallace, (1932) L.R. 59 I.A. 206 (P.C.) [Privy
Councilj. [Hereinafter, "Shaw Wallace"l
Shaw Wallace,
Shaw Wallace.
Shaw Wallace.
Shaw Wallace.
Shaw Wallace.
Shaw Wallace.
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of income. Revenue's proposition was that these items had to be specifically
excluded because the Act envisaged them as income.61 The Court, however,
attributed the enactment of the provision to the anxiety of the draftsman."
Furthermore, the Court denied the influence of the British conception of
income and English judicial decisions.Y Yet, it recited the same. It introduced
amplifications to the concept of income under the Act such as "coming in",'
monetary return (money or anything being capable of turned into money from its
own nature)", periodicity, productivity and the distinction between income and
capital. From a practical standpoint, such a conception excluded windfalls, gains
arising from transfers (capital receipts), benefits in kind that were not convertible
into money, and imputed income from the scope of income.
A review of the Privy Council's decision in Gopal Saran Narain Singh v.
Commissioner of Income Tax" confirms the judiciary's adoption of the source
conception of income. The facts of this case were as follows. A taxpayer transferred
an estate worth Rs.20,000,000 for a relatively small annuity of Rs. 2, 40,000 for life.
It was argued that the annuity in toto could not constitute his income as it provided
no "profit" or "gain" to him. A part of the installments merely represented return
of capital. The Privy Council, however, held that the entire annuity receipt was
income in the hands of the taxpayer, "as the term income was not qualified by the
notion of profits or gains. Anything which can properly be described as income
65 Shaw Wallace.
66 Shaw Wallace.
67 The Privy Council observed, 'Again their Lordships would discard altogether the case
law which has been so painfully evolved in the construction of the English incometax statutes-both the cases upon which the High Court relied and the flood of other
decisions which has been let loose in this Board. The Indian Act is not in pari materia;
it is less elaborate in many ways, subject to fewer refinements, and in arrangement

and language it differs greatly from the provisions with which the Courts in this
country have had to deal. Under these conditions their Lordships think that little can
be gained by attempting to reason from one to the other, at all events in the present
case in which they think that the solution of the problem lies very near the surface
of the Act, and depends mainly on general considerations." However, in later cases,
the Supreme Court acknowledged the influence of the British legal interpretation of

68
69
70

income,
The Court did not explain the taxation of owner-occupied houses provided for under
the Income Tax Act, 1922.
The Court did not explain the provision in the Income Tax Act, 1922 for the taxation
of rent free accommodation provided to the employee by the employer, even though
the latter could not sublet and hence convert it into money.
Gopal Saran Narain Singh v. Commissioner of Income Tax, 3 ITR 237 (P.C.) [Privy
Council]. [Hereinafter, "Gopal"l
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is taxable under the Act unless expressly exempted. ' 71 This case completed Shaw
Wallace's articulation of the British conception of income. The judiciary perceived
income as a "flow from a source" rather than an economic gain. This perception
led to the taxation of "illusory gains," as in this case.
B. Statutory Definition of Income
In 1939, the Act was amended to insert an "inclusive"' definition of income.7
The definition specifically included dividends and perquisites or profits received
in lieu of salary as income. These inclusions were consistent with the judicial
conception of income. 74 The specific mention of dividends was to ensure the
taxation of all distributions by corporations." Further, by the Finance Act, § 4 (3)
(v),76 which excluded capital sums received in commutation of pension income or
in payment of insurance policy, was deleted.
Post the insertion of the statutory definition of income, the court broached
the subject in Kamakshya Narain Singh v. Commissioner." This case is marked for
its critique of the Shaw Wallace definition of income. The case revolved around
the taxability of royalties arising from the leasing of coal mines. The taxpayer
argued that coal on his land was capital, and the sums that he received from time
to time for each ton raised and despatched was a capital receipt, being the price in
exchange for a capital asset. Alternatively, he argued on grounds of equity, stating
that coal was a wasting property and was gradually exhausted as each ton was
71
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Gopal.
The law of statutory interpretation in India accords a special significance to an inclusive
definition. In N.D.P. Namboodripad v. Union of India, AIR 2007 SC 1782 [Supreme
Court of Indial the Supreme Court noted "When the word 'include' is used in a
definition clause, it is used as a word of enlargement that is to make the definition
extensive and not restrictive". Further, on several occasions, the Indian courts have
commented on the 'inclusive' aspect of the definition as implying a broad statutory
concept of income: "Income includes not only those things which this clause declares
that it shall include, but such things as the word signifies according to its natural
import...." See Commissioner of Income Tax v. Kiranbhai, 1999 235 ITR 635 Guj [Gujarat
High Court].
§ 4 (6C), The Income Tax Act, 1922 defined income as follows: "Income includes
anything included in 'dividend' as defined in clause (6A) and anything which under
Explanation 2 to subsection (1)of section 7 is a profit received in lieu of salary for
purposes of that sub-section

... "
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209, Kanga.
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45, OP. Chawla.
See § 4 (3) (v), The Income Tax Act 1922.
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Kamakshya Narain Singh v. Commissioner, 11 ITR 513 (1942) (PC) [Privy Council].
[Hereinafter, "Kamakshya Narain Singh"]
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raised and disposed off. In other words, as the taxpayer was experiencing a gain
with the royalty receipts, he was simultaneously facing a decline in the value of
the mine. And hence his gain was illusory. The Court, however, held the royalties
to be taxable.
As regards the first argument, the Court rejected royalties as the purchase
price paid for coal. The Court held that the royalties, in substance, were rent: the
compensation which the occupier paid the landlord for the species of occupation
which the contract between them allowed. The court classified the consideration
received under the lease into three categories (1) the premium; (2) the minimum
royalty; (3) the royalties per ton. The premium was held to be a capital receipt,
received for parting with "the right to enjoy the benefits (a capital asset)." But
the royalties were seen on a different footing. The minimum royalty was payable
only if, in any year, the royalties on coal raised and despatched were less than the
sum fixed as the minimum royalty. This, according to the Court, amounted to a
species of annual guarantee: it did not correspond to any coal actually extracted
and taken away; it was simply "income" flowing from the covenants in the lease.
It would be payable if, in any year, the lessees took no coal at all, or if the coal
was exhausted before the termination of the lease. On the other hand, the royalty
payable on each ton of coal was a fluctuating amount and, as such, the Court faced
a dilemma on account of the periodicity criterion laid down by the Privy Council
in Shaw Wallace. Also, relying on Shaw Wallace's tree and fruit analogy, the taxpayer
argued that in his case, "There was no fruit; that is to say, there was no increase,
there was no sowing or reaping in the ordinary sense of the term; and there were
no periodical harvests."
In this context, the Court critiqued the conception of income discussed in
Shaw Wallace:
"Sir George Lowendes speaks of income being likened pictorially to the
fruit of a tree or the crop of a field. But it is clear that such picturesque
similes cannot be used to limit the true characterof income ....
Income is not
necessarilythe recurrentreturnfrom a definite source, though it is generally
of that character.Income again may consist of a series of separate receipts,
as it generally does in the case of professionalearnings."1
At first glance, it appears that the Court was departing from the Shaw Wallace
definition of income. Scholarship interprets this decision as such. However, on a
closer evaluation, the Court's decision in substance adheres to Shaw Wallace.
78
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Consider the Court's purported rejection of the "periodicity" criterion and
the preceding discussion where the Court classifies the lease consideration into
three categories. The Court held that the guaranteed minimum royalties were
income. Critical to the Court's reasoning was the fact that these guaranteed amounts
clearly met the criteria of periodicity as they represented "regular" flows from
a source (covenants of the lease). However, the Court perceived the fluctuation
in the royalty payable per ton as a hindrance to the fulfilment of the periodicity
criterion of Shaw Wallace. As discussed previously, periodicity demands recurrence
of receipts or the possibility of future successive wealth. It does not impose the
condition of regularity Therefore, the royalty payable per ton met the periodicity
criterion. The Court's observations could then have two plausible explanations.
One, the Court misconceived periodicity to imply regularity. Two, Shaw Wallace
envisaged periodic flows as both recurrent and regular receipts, and the Court
limited periodicity to the mere "'possibility of future successive flow".
Now, consider the Court's critique of Shaw Wallace's simile of the tree and
its fruit. The Court's observations arose in the following context. The taxpayer
contended that in a mining lease, there was no fruit; no reaping or sowing in the
ordinary sense. Here, the taxpayer was referring to coal as the tangible capital
asset or source, which he argued was the subject of sale with the royalties being
consideration for the same. The Court characterized the transaction as one where
the source was the right to enjoy the benefits of the lease and the royalty payments
were its fruit. The premium paid for acquiring this right was held to be a capital
receipt. Hence, the Court agreed to the simile of the tree and its fruit, conforming
to the capital-income distinction.
In dealing with the taxpayer's second argument, the Court followed the source
conception of income. It was argued that royalty payments did not represent a
gain because they were accompanied by a simultaneous decline in the value of the
mining lease. The Court briskly dismissed the argument and observed, "The fact
that mines are wasting assets is irrelevant." A net accretion perspective of income
would have appreciated the taxpayer's claim. Under the net accretion approach,
the royalty receipts would remain taxable. However, the tax would be accompanied
by a deduction for the economic decline in the value of the mine.
If the Court adhered to the Shaw Wallace view of income, how does one
explain its formal critique of the same? Plausibly, the Court misinterpreted the
proposition laid down in Shaw Wallace. Alternatively, the Court may have sought
to retract the prescriptive formulation of income under Shaw Wallace because of
the existence of the more inclusive definition of income in the statute. Judicial
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propriety warrants that the courts follow legislation. However, the exercise of
judicial self-restraint on one occasion does not mark a change in the judiciary's
perception of income. This is evident from subsequent cases, where the judiciary
continued to follow the source view.
C. Introduction of the CapitalGains Tax
The most important digression from the source conception was the
introduction of "capital gains tax" in 1948. The definition of income under the Act
was amended to include capital gains and a new head of income was introduced
in § 6 of the Act." Further, § 4 (3) (vii) which excluded casual and non-recurring
receipts from income was amended to deny the benefit to capital gains.
Capital gains were defined to include gains arising from the sale or exchange
of a "capital asset."1 Further, capital asset was defined broadly to mean property
of any kind (excluding stock in trade, personal effects and agricultural land).8
From the set of capital receipts, a small subset arising from the sale or
exchange of "capital asset"" was made taxable. Other gains that represented
accretions to capital remained non- taxable. Thus, the term "capital gains" came
to signify "taxable gains" or "taxable capital receipts."5 In addition, a lower rate
of taxation was extended to the entire set of taxable gains.
While introducing the capital gains tax, the Finance Minister noted in his
budget speech:
"My next proposal is a tax on capitalgains. Honourablemembers must be
well awareof the extent to which large capitalgains have been made in recent
years and are still being made owing to prevailingconditions. These profits
are, as the law stands, outside the scope of the Income Tax Act. Ifeel very
strongly that this lacunain our legislationshould be filled. There is stronger
79
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§ 12 B, The Income Tax Act, 1922.
§ 4A, The Income Tax Act, 1922.
§ 4A, The Income Tax Act, 1922.
Gains arising from the transfer of an asset that formed the inventory of a business,
for instant receipts arising from sale of land in a real estate business, were taxable
even under the source conception of income. This is because the land in this context

did not represent the source but a trading asset. The receipts arising therefrom were
categorized as revenue receipts, and land as a trading asset.
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justificationfor taxing these profits than there isjfr taxing ordinaryincome
since they represent what is properly unearned increment. The U.S.A. taxes
such profits."b
The introduction of capital gains tax was justified on grounds of equity For
India's fiscal policy, the inclusion of capital gains in "taxable income" signified the
beginning of a changed perception of income-accretions to capital enhance the
ability to pay and should be taxed as income. A tax on capital gains diverged from
the income-capital distinction, periodicity and productivity. India's fiscal policy
took its first step toward the net accretion conception of income.
Because income had acquired a meaning under the source conception,
the constitutionality of the capital gains tax was challenged before the Supreme
Court.8 7 It was argued that the Constitution empowered the Central Government
to impose "taxes on income" and income did not embrace capital gains either
according to its "natural import"M or common usage or according to judicial
interpretation of relevant legislation in England or India. Further, it was contended
that a clear line of demarcation had always been observed by English lawyers and
English jurists between income and capital, that the English legislative practice
had always recognised this difference and that as the word had come to acquire
a certain meaning and a certain connotation by reason of such legislative practice
in England, the British Parliament which enacted the Government of India Act,
1935 must be regarded as having understood and used the word "income" in the
Constitution in that sense.
Observations made by the Court in response to these arguments assist our
cause. First,the Court confirmed that the basis of the Privy Council's decision in
Shaw Wallace had been inspired by the scheduler philosophy. It observed:
"The truth of the matter is that while Income-tax legislation adopts an
inclusive definition of the word 'income' the scheme of such legislation is
to bring to charge only such income as falls under certain specified heads
(e.g., the 5 Schedules of the EnglishAct of 1918 and our section 6 read with
the following sections) and as arises or accrues or is received or is deemed
to arise or accrue or to be received as mentioned in the statute. The Courts
86
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Finance Minister's Budget Speech, (1947) 15 ITR (St.) 10.
Navinchandra Mafatlal v. Commissioner of Income Tax, (1954) 26 ITR 758 (SC)
[Supreme Court of India]. [Hereinafter, "Navinchandra Mafatlal"]
Income in its natural import signified income as was understood in the source
conception of income.
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have striven to ascertain the meaning of the word "income" in the context
of this scheme."
Indeed, the courts were following the source conception of income to interpret
income under the income tax law.
Second, the Court sanctified the capital gains tax by drawing a distinction
between the meaning of income under the Act and the Constitution:
"There is no reason to suppose that the interpretationplaced by the Courts
on the word in question was intended to be exhaustive of the connotation
of the word "income" outside the particularstatute. If we hold, as we are
asked to do, that the meaning of the word "income" has become rigidly
crystallised by reason of the judicial interpretationof that word appearing
in the Income-tax Act then logically no enlargement of the scope of the
Income-tax Act, by amendment or otherwise, will be permissible infuture.
A conclusion so extravagantand astoundingcan scarcely be contemplated
or countenanced.""
In effect, the Court concluded that the source view was limited to
understanding income under the Act. As regards the Constitution, income was
to be interpreted according to its meaning in English, "coming in," whereby any
receipt could be made chargeable to tax. Two points should be noted here. First,
the Court respects the source conception of income, holding it valid under the Act.
Second, by drawing a distinction between income under the Act and under the
Constitution, it assures policymakers the freedom to tamper with the source view
of income. To rephrase, source conception was followed in interpreting income
under the Act. However, if the legislature wished to tax receipts outside the source
view vide a specific enactment, the courts would respect it.
Consequently, there emerged the practice of addressing items specifically
included in income by the legislature, in deviation from the source view, as
"artificial income" (a term that commonly appears in the income tax commentaries
of Kanga, Palkhivala and Vyas).
D. judiciary'sinconsistentapplicationof the Shaw Wallace Conception
In 1952, the Supreme Court rendered its next noted decision on the meaning
of income in Raghuvanshi Mills v. Commissioner of Income Tax.9 The case entailed
89
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Again, income in its natural import signified income as was understood in the source
conception of income.
Raghuvanshi Mills v. Commissioner of Income Tax, (1952) 22 ITR 484 (SC) [Supreme
Court of India]. (Hereinafter, "Raghuvanshi Mills"]
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the question of the taxability of insurance proceeds received for the loss of profits
occasioned by the destruction of the taxpayer's factory in a fire. The insurance
proceeds were received pursuant to a policy taken specifically to cover the loss
in profits.
The Court attached significance to the fact that the insurance proceeds were
received in lieu of profits. These profits, if earned, would have been operating
revenue and taxable income, On the other hand, had the insurance compensated
for the loss of the factory (a capital asset), the proceeds would have been nontaxable as they were capital receipts." The Court thus followed the income-capital
distinction.
In addition, it was argued by the taxpayer that the insurance proceeds would
not qualify as income because they did not recur. Nor did they directly arise from
an economic activity."
The court responded by referring to § 4 (3) (vii) of the Act, which excluded
casual and non-recurring receipts from the tax net, provided these receipts did
not arise from business or the exercise of a profession or vocation. It then held that
the insurance receipt was inseparably connected with the ownership and conduct
of the business, and arose from it."

§ 4 (3) (vii), however, was an exclusion. It did not render casual and nonrecurring receipts arising in the course of an economic activity, or insurance
receipts, expressly taxable. These receipts would remain non-taxable if they did
not qualify under the general conception of income. The taxpayer proposed the
definition in Shaw Wallace as the general conception of income: "income comes in
with some sort of regularity or expected regularity from definite sources.""
Confronted with a situation where a strict reading of Shaw Wallace would
prevent the taxation of these insurance receipts as income, the Court observed:
"Itis true the Judicial Committee attempted a narrower definition in
Commissioner of Income-tax v. Shaw Wallace & Co., by limiting income to
"aperiodicalmonetary return 'coming in' with some sort of regularity,or
expected regularityfromdefinite sources" but, in our opinion, those remarks
must be read with reference to the particularfacts of that case.....
we do not
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think their Lordships had in mind a case of this nature when they decided
Shaw Wallance & Company's case."1
The following proposes two plausible explanations for the court to have
read down Shaw Wallace.
First, consistent with its approach in Kamakshya Narain Singh, the Supreme
Court attempted to seek a more flexible definition of income than that given in Shaw
Wallace, such that it would yield to the legislative mandate where required. The
statute itself exempted receipts that did not meet the productivity and periodicity
criteria. The Shaw Wallace definition of income simply overlay these limitations and
rendered them meaningless. To give effect to the statute, the Court would have to
read down the Shaw Wallace definition of income.
Second, independent of the statute, the Court perceived these insurance
receipts as income. The Court observed:
"The assessee is a business company. Its aim is to make profits and to insure
against loss. In the ordinary way it does this by buying raw materials,
manufacturinggoods out of them and selling them so that on balance there
is a profit or gain to itself But it also has other ways of acquiringgain, as
do all prudent businesses, namely by insuring againstloss of profts."'
The Court's view was that a receipt arising in the ordinary course of an
economic activity fulfilled the productivity criteria. The non-recurrence of the
receipt was inconsequential. However, the decision did not rid the judicial
conception of income of the periodicity criteria. A more appropriate presentation
of the holding is, "Gains arising from isolated transactions are not income unless
they are part of a pattern of transactions undertaken in the carrying on of a trade
or business.'
The dicta of the case gave rise to several decisions that were inconsistent with
the Shaw Wallace conception, but only with regard to periodicity and productivity.
The income-capital distinction, the hallmark of the source conception, was always
strictly observed. In addition, income was still viewed as an inflow in the form of
money or benefits convertible into money.
Consider the following illustrations. The Bombay High Court adjudged the
issue of whether monthly alimony received under a court decree was income.'
95 Raghuvanshi Mills.
96 Raghuvanshi Mills.
97 164, K. Holmes.
98 Maheshwaridevi v. Commissioner of Income Tax, 1984 147 ITR 258 Born [Bombay
High Court]. [Hereinafter, "Maheshwaridevi"]
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Although these receipts were recurrent, they did not arise from any economic
activity. Nor did these receipts represent windfalls. The Court regarded the right
to receive alimony as a capital asset and a source." This case is cited as an example
where periodic flows from an enforceable obligation were regarded as income, and
where the criterion of productivity was rendered inconsequential. On the other
hand, a voluntary gift was regarded as a casual payment even if it was repeated
and took the form of a regular annual allowance. According to the Court, the gift
represented a windfall.'
On another occasion, the Supreme Court remarked that winnings from
horse-racing would be taxable under the Act, but for the exception made for
casual and non-recurrent receipts. It rendered both periodicity and productivity
inconsequential to the meaning of income."' Furthermore, in due course, the
legislature deleted the provision excluding casual and non-recurring receipts.'0
Despite the deletion, Courts have held personal gifts to be non-taxable under the
general conception of income.tS Similarly, the gains embodied in the life insurance
receipt were held to be non-taxable. A capital receipt (not being a capital gain)
4
remained untaxed on account of the income-capital distinction.'1
E. Fiscal Policy's Evolving View of Income
The Finance Act, 1955 brought several changes to the definition of income
which deviated from the source conception of income. Again, these legislative
changes signified the changing perspective of the policymaker.
A number of "artificial incomes" were made taxable. First, capital receipts
compensating for the loss of certain sources of income were included in the
definition of income. The compensation for loss of office as a managing agent or
99 Maheshwaridevi.
100 574, Anrit Kunwar.
101 Syed Jalal v. Commissioner of Income Tax, 196039 ITR 660 Mad [Madras High Court],
671
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102 The provision was deleted vide The Finance Act, 2003.
103 Commissioner of income Tax v. Sarbamangala Devi, 1987163 ITR898 Patna [Patna High

Court]; Lohtse Co-op. Housing Society Ltd. v.lncomeTax Officer, (1994) 125 Taxation
13; Department of Finance, Ministry of Finance, Government of India, Circular No.
158 (27th December, 1974).
104 Commissioner of Income Tax v. B.K. Roy, 248 ITR 245 (SC) [Supreme Court of
India].
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cessation of agency was made taxable as business income."" Compensation received
for loss of employment became taxable as salaries.' 0' These receipts had been held
to be non-taxable by the Courts, pursuant to the income-capital distinction. Second,
several benefits enjoyed by employees and directors of corporations were made
taxable as income, despite the fact that some of these benefits were not capable of
being converted into money.'7
As noted previously, the 1948 capital gains tax covered gains from transfers
arising vide a sale or an exchange. This tax was withdrawn in 1949, ostensibly
because of its adverse effect on investment, the resultant hindrance to the free
movement of securities in the capital market and the small yield.'0 ' None of the
given reasons had a bearing on the conception of income. In 1956, the capital gains
tax was reintroduced. Once more, the Finance Minister justified the inclusion of
capital gains within income on account of the ability to pay. He noted:
"Capitalgains are an importantfactorin aggravatingeconomic inequalities
and there is no justificationfor regardingcapitalgains as a species of income
"19
not liable to tax. 0
This time the scope of the tax was widened. Earlier gains arising from the sale
or exchange of capital assets were made taxable. The provision now taxed gains
arising from the sae,,exchange, transfer or relinquishment of a capital asset."' Thus,
the Act enlarged the subset of taxable gains realized from certain dispositions of
assets. From the policymaker's perspective, the move marked a further dilution
of the source conception of income.
F. Adoption of the Income Tax Act, 1961
Act of 1922 was replaced by the Act of 1961, which is the law currently in
force in India. The new Act did not mark a change in India's philosophy on income
tax. The provisions discussed hitherto were retained in the new Act.
105 O.P.Chawla states, "The general principle accepted in the Indian IncomeTax Law until
1955 had been that compensation for wrongful repudiation of a service agreement, or
for loss of office or employment or cessation of business was a capital receipt, though
the payment might be entirely voluntary and the recipient might have no legal right
to any compensation at all", See 1972, OT, Chawla. See also Explanation 2 § 7(l), The
Income Tax Act, 1922 and §10 (5A), The Income Tax Act, 1922.

106 See 1972, O.P. Chawla. See also Explanation 2, § 7(l), The Income Tax Act, 1922 and
§10 (5A), The Income Tax Act, 1922.
107 § 2 (6C), The Income Tax Act 1922.
108 39-47, O.P. Chawla.
109 3947, O.P. Chawla.
110 39-47, O.P. Chawla.
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The 1961 Act extended the policymakers' resolve to tax gains arising from
every kind of disposition of property. Capital gains were re-defined as gains arising
from the "transfer" of a capital asset.1" In addition to a sale or an exchange, the
term "transfer" was defined to include artificial categories such as relinquishment,
the extinguishment of any rights, and the conversion of an asset into stock in
trade. 1 2 This, coupled with a broad definition of capital asset1"3 as property of
any kind, ensured that almost no gains arising from the disposition of property
would go tax-free. This new definition of transfer practically diluted the incomecapital distinction. Situations arose where Courts expressed doubts regarding the
taxability of certain gains that the formal letter of the law did not capture clearly.
For instance, the Courts stood divided on whether insurance proceeds received
for a capital asset lost in fire, arose vide a transfer as formally defined."' On such
occasions, the legislature would promptly insert a statutory provision to confirm
the taxability of the impugned gain."15Thus, whilst the income-capital distinction
remained ingrained in the minds of the judiciary and in scholarship, policy steadily
moved toward its abolition.
111 § 45, The Income Tax Act, 1961 states that "any profits or gains arising from the transfer
of a capital asset effected in the previous year shall ..
be chargeable to income-tax under
the head "Capital gains", and shall be deemed to be the income of the previous year
in which the transfer took place."
112 § 2 (47), The Income Tax Act, 1961 defined 'transfer' as follows:
""transfer", in relation to a capital asset, includes,(i) the sale, exchange or relinquishment of the asset; or
(il) the extinguishment of any rights therein; or
(iii) the compulsory acquisition thereof under any law; or
(iv) in a case where the asset is converted by the owner thereof into, or is treated by him
as, stock-in- trade of a business carried on by him, such conversion or treatment, or
(iva) the maturity or redemption of a zero coupon bond; or
(v) any transaction involving the allowing of the possession of any immovable property
to be taken or retained in part performance of a contract of the nature referred to in
section 53A of the Transfer of Property Act, 1882 (4 of 1882); or
(vi) any transaction (whether by way of becoming a member of, or acquiring shares in,
a co-operative society company or other association of persons or by way of any

agreement or any arrangement or in any other manner whatsoever) which has the
effect of transferring, or enabling the enjoyment of, a"
113 §2(14), The Income Tax Act 1961.
114 Vania Silk Mills v. Commissioner of Income Tax, 191 ITR 647 (SC) [Supreme Court of
India]; Commissioner of Income Tax v.Grace Collis, 248 ITR 323 (SC) [Supreme Court
of India].
115 §45 (1A) was inserted by The Finance Act, 1999, which provided that where any person
receives insurance money on account of damage or destruction of a capital asset due to
the circumstances specified therein, the same shall be taxable in the year of receipt.
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Next, the Finance Act, 1964 further eroded the judiciary's understanding of
income as a receipt necessarily convertible into cash. In the past, the legislature had
targeted benefits received by employees. This taxable treatment was now extended
to non-monetary benefits arising in the course of business or profession."' Further,
in 1972, windfall gains in the form of winnings from lotteries and games were
included in the definition of income."' The Central Board of Direct Taxes explained
in the provision, "the exemption from tax of such receipts is not in keeping with
the principle of taxing equally persons with equal capacity to pay. ' ' Indeed, the
explanation conformed to the net accretion view of income.
G. Judiciary'sAffirmative Departurefrom the Source Conception
In 1981 and 1993, the Supreme Court rendered decisions that marked
an affirmative departure from the judicial conception of income adopted so
far. The first of these cases was Bhagwandas Jain v. Union of India,"' where the
constitutionality of tax imposed on imputed rent was under challenge. This
was reminiscent of Navinchandra Mafatlal's case (previously discussed),'" which
challenged the constitutionality of the capital gains tax. In the instant case, the
taxpayer argued that he was not deriving any monetary benefit by residing in
his own house and, therefore, no tax could be levied on the grounds that he was
deriving income from that house. The argument was supported by the proposition
that income meant the realization of a monetary benefit and that, in the absence of
any such realization, the inclusion of any amount by way of notional income was
impermissible. The Court justified the tax on the reasoning that imputed rent had
been taxed as income sihce the inception of the Act in 1922. Thus, when the British
Parliament enacted the Government of India Act, 1935 (which forms the basis of
the Indian Constitution), it must have perceived income as including imputed
rent. The court also relied on the rationale of its earlier decision in Navinchandra
Mafatlal.
The observation relevant to our purpose is as follows:
"Even in its ordinary economic sense, the expression 'income' includes not
merely what is received or what comes in by exploiting the use of a property
but also what one saves by using it oneself. That which can be converted into
§§ 28 (iv) and 2 (24) (vd), The Income Tax Act, 1961.
§ 2 (24) (ix), The Income Tax Act, 1961.
Central Board of Direct Taxes, Circular No. 108, (20th March, 1973).
Bhagwandasjain v. Union of India, (1981)128 ITR 315 (SC) [Supreme Court of Indial.
[Hereinafter, "Bhagwandas Jain"]
120 Navinchandra Mafatlal.
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income can be reasonablyregardedas giving rise to income. The tax levied
under Act is on the income (though computed in an artificial way) from
house property in the above sense and not on house property." 21
This was the first time that the Supreme Court considered the meaning
of income in the "economic sense." Recall Simon's definition of income under
the net accretion perspective, i.e., as the sum of an individual's saving and
consumption. Furthermore, the Court did not let the existing conception of income
as an 'incoming' hinder its decision. Unfortunately, this observation was not the
mainstay of the Court's decision, and was subsequently viewed in the context of
imputed rent alone.
The second decision was rendered in Commissioner of Income Tax v. G.R.
Karthikeyan.Y' The statute rendered winnings from "lotteries, card games and
crossword puzzles and other games" specifically taxable under the Act. 1' The
issue in this case was regarding the taxability of winnings from a car race. The
taxpayer argued that a car race did not fall within the purview of "other games"
and hence, the resultant winnings were non-taxable under the specific clause.
Note that §10 (3 ),M which exempted casual and recurring receipts from tax, had
been amended to provide for an exemption limit. The winnings in this case fell
outside that exemption limit.
The Court held that winnings from a car race were income irrespective of
whether they qualified under the specific clause as "winnings from other games." It
reasoned that the definition of income under the Act was inclusive. Consequently,
the meaning of income under the Act should be synonymous with its meaning
under the Constitution of India.
The Court was here referring to the case of Navinchandra Mafatlal, which
had drawn a distinction between the meaning of income under the Act and
the Constitution."' As regards the Act, income could be interpreted within the
boundaries of the source conception. But, under the Constitution, income was to
be understood in the broadest sense, according to its ordinary meaning in English,
as anything that comes in or rather any profit or gain.
121 Bhagwandas Jain.
122 Commissioner of Income Tax v.G.R.Karthikeyan, AIR 1993 SC 1671 [Supreme Court
of India]. [Hereinafter, "G.R.Karthikeyan"]
123 § 2 (24) (ix), The Income Tax Act, 1961.
124 The provision was amended vide The Finance Act, 1986-1987. Aceiling of Rs.2500/was introduced for exemption.
125 Navinchandra MafatlaL.
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In G.R. Karthikeyan, the Supreme Court abolished this distinction. 26 Further,
the Court held that the casual nature of the receipts would have no bearing on its
decision. According to the Court, the very fact that casual receipts were expressly
z
exempted under the statute signified that they otherwise would have been income. "
Thus, the Court disregarded the criteria of periodicity and productivity.
Unlike the previous case of Bhagwan Das, the Supreme Court in Karthikeyan
did not show a leaning toward an economic view of income. In fact, it proposed that
the judiciary have no view of income, source or otherwise. In essence, it contemplated
any profit or gain as income under the income tax statute unless it was specifically
exempted.
Despite these decisions, the source view of income persisted in subsequent
case law and tax scholarship.
H. From source to net accretion
From a pragmatic perspective, the last phase of legislative changes to the
definition of income brought India's conception of income to the net accretion
end of the spectrum.
In 2002, the definition of income was amended to include compensation
paid for restraint on trading or on the exercise of profession.126 This provision
was introduced to cover cases where such compensation did not fall within the
purview of capital gains.'3
Furthermore, in 2003, § 10 (3), which had exempted casual and non-recurring
receipts from the levy of income tax, was deleted from the Act.'- This provision
had already been diluted to a considerable extent. First, capital gains had been
removed from its scope and, subsequently, so were winnings from lotteries. In
due course, a ceiling for exemption under this clause was introduced for all casual
and non-recurring receipts. The Department of Revenue circular explaining the
omission specified that the purpose of the omission was to bring these receipts
in the tax net. More importantly, the reason cited was the rationalization of the
definition of income.13
126 C.R. Karthikeyan.
127 G.R. Karthikeyan.

128 §28 (va), The Income Tax Act 1961.
129

§ 28 (va), The Income Tax Act, 1961.

130 The Finance Act, 2003.
131 Department of Revenue, Ministry of Finance, Government of India, CircularNo. 7/2003,
(9th September, 2003).
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Finally, in 2006, any gift of money exceeding Rs. 50,000 was rendered taxable
under the Act.'- However, broad exceptions were created under this rule to exclude
T
gifts received from relatives's and on the occurrence of certain events. M
In 2009,
the provision was extended to tax gifts received in kind.
Currently, the following receipts remain non-taxable under the new Act of
1961: personal gifts, life insurance receipts and the residue of any capital receipts
not falling within the purview of capital gains or any other specific provision.
In addition, the problem of taxation of illusory gains (as in the case of annuities)
still persists under the Ad. While fiscal policy moved toward the net accretion
conception, it failed to address this issue.
IV. Taxable Income under the Direct Taxes Code Bill, 2009
In 2009, the Government released the new Direct Taxes Code, 5 accompanied
by a discussion paper which explained the underlying fiscal policy. As regards the
conception of income, the discussion paper stated the following:
"Ifequitable taxationshould be in accordancewith the capacity to pay of the
taxpaying unit, and ifincome is to be taken as a measure of the capacity to
pay, it must be so defined r tax purposes as to reflect adequately the potential
economic welfare of the individual concerned i.e., the capacity has to spend
during a year without affecting his net worth at the beginning of the year.
This means that definition must be comprehensive enough to include all
accrualsto spendingpower The conventional definitionof income does not do
so. Ideally, we need a comprehensive definition of 'income'for tax purposes.
Such a definition of income, would include apartfrom gifts received,
132 § 56 (2)(vi), The Income Tax Act, 1961.
133 Relative was defined to Include:
"(a) spouse of the Individual;
(b) brother or sister of the individual;
(c) brother or sister of the spouse of the individual;
(d) brother or sister of the either of the parents of the individual;
(e) any lineal ascendant or descendant of the individual;
(f) any lineal ascendant or descendant of the spouse of the individual;

(g)
spouse qf the person referred to in clause (ii) to (vi)".
134 On the occasion of marriage of the individual; or under a will orby way of inheritance;
or in contemplation of death of the payer
135 See Direct Tax Code (2009), Department of Revenue, Ministry of Finance, Government
of India available at http.jfinminnic.in/DTCode/Direct%2Taxes%2Code%20BiU%20
2009.pdf.
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(a) All earnings including labour,investment and business income net of
cost of earning and depreciation
(b) Net accruedcapital gains i.e. net increasesin capital assets owned
(c) Value of services or utility of non-business assets owned;
(d) Imputed value of the services rendered by the members of thefamily
(e) Windfall gains
(f)Casualreceipts
The conceptual basis oftthe definition of income is clear: the definition equates income
to change in net worth. However, in practiceit is not possible to measure satisfactorilyall
the elements included....3
The discussion paper identified these elements as: imputed income (value
of services or utility of non-business assets and the imputed value of services
rendered by members of the fmily), unrealized accretions in the value of assets,
and economic depreciation and taxation of shareholders on the undistributed
profits of the company." Finally, it concluded:
"In line with the principlesand problems discussed, the Code seeks to adopt,
to the extent possible, a comprehensive definition of income. Therefore,
income for the purposes of the code will, in general, include all accruals and
receipts of revenue and capitalnature unless otherwise specified." 1
For the first time, India's conception of income was clearly stated in its fiscal
policy. Furthermore, this was accompanied by the explicit adoption of the net
accretion view of income. This marked a major change in India's income tax law.
Yet, it drew little attention in scholarly circles. This was because not much had
changed on the surface of the new code. Recall that policy had been continually
moving toward the net accretion view of income. Consequently, the Act had been
amended several times to reflect this evolving view of income. Most receipts that
were not income under the source view but qualified as such under net accretion
had been made taxable under the 1961 Act." ' As such, from a practitioner's
perspective, there would be little practical significance to the explicit adoption of
the net accretion approach.
136 Discussion Paper on Direct Taxes Code (2009), Department of Revenue, Ministry of
Finance, Government of India availableat http//finmin.nic.in/DTCode/Discussion%20
Paper.pdf. [Hereinafter, "Discussion Paper"J
137 Discussion Paper.
138 Discussion Paper.
139 With the exception of gifts, life insurance receipts and capital receipts.
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However, the explicit adoption of a comprehensive conception of income
under the Direct Taxes Code Bill would synchronize the judiciary's and the
policymaker's views of income. In addition, there are a few notable changes
from the 1961 Act. First, all receipts that enhance a person's ability to pay, such
as life insurance receipts, are now recognized as income.' Exemptions, if any,
have been made on the considerations of positive externalities, encouraging
human development and reducing risk, equity, and reducing compliance and
administrative burden. Second, illusory gains should not be taxable under the
proposed Direct Taxes Code Bill. As discussed, under the source conception,
income was perceived as a flow rather than an economic gain, leading the judiciary
to tax the inflow without considering the corresponding diminution in the value
of assets such as annuities. In contrast, net accretion taxes the economic gain
alone as income. As such, the Direct Tax Code contains no provision to guide the
computation of a taxable annuity.
Finally, under the 1922 and 1961 Acts, the legislature had made inroads into
the income-capital distinction by taxing accretions to property on their realization
as capital gains. Thus, "capital gains" became synonymous with "taxable
accretions" or "taxable capital receipts." However, under the new code, as is the
case in the United States, all accruals and receipts, whether revenue or capital in
nature, are regarded as income, in consonance with the net accretion view. The
United States' Internal Revenue Code taxes all accretions to property on their
realization (arising from the sale or disposition of property). However, from
these economic gains, it creates a subset called capital gains. The object behind
creating this subset is to tax certain gains at a preferential rate, namely the gains
realized from the transfer of investment assets. Several policy objectives such as
the promotion of savings are cited to justify such a preferential rate.IC Thus, two
concepts emerged under the U.S. law: ordinary gains and capital gains (a subset
of ordinary gains that are taxed at preferential rates). As Graetz notes, "capital
gain is a creature of the tax law, without a direct analogue in either economics or
accounting. " 14 The explicit adoption of the net accretion approach makes India's
taxation of accretions to property comparable to that of the United States. The
Direct Taxes Code, 2010 draws a distinction between business capital assets'4 and
140 § 56, The Direct Tax Code, 2010. Although a deduction is provided for these amounts
if certain condition are met.
141 Graetz.
142 Graetz.
143 Graetz.
144 § 248 (42), The Direct Tax Code, 2010 defines a "business capital asset" as:
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investment capital assets. 145 The gains arising from the former are taxed under the
head of'income from business' and are subjected to ordinary rates of tax (ordinary
gains). Gains arising from the transfer of investment assets are called capital gains.
Interestingly, India seeks to tax capital gains at ordinary rates. Consequently, the
question arises as to why the Direct Taxes Code Bill creates these two sets of gains
- ordinary gains and capital gains. Plausibly, this distinction has been introduced
for the purposes of computation and to grant certain capital gains the benefit of
indexation and roll-over benefit.

V. CONCLUSION
India's judicial conception of taxable income has been inspired by the source
view of income. The judiciary began with a strict adoption of the source conception
of income. However, over the years, it attempted to recede from this. Plausibly,
this was a consequence of the introduction of an inclusive definition of income,
followed by legislative amendments that departed from the source view. The Courts
sought a neutral stance and took the aid of a formalist interpretation of income.
Yet, in cases involving interpretation, the Courts resorted to the source conception.
Moreover, the Courts were flexible with regard to the criteria of periodicity and
productivity. However, the income-capital distinction remained entrenched in
the judicial mind.
On the other hand, India's tax policy and statutes have been in transition to
the net accretion view of taxable income. Noticeably, India's fiscal policy embraced
the net accretion view in a piecemeal fashion. This piecemeal approach in fact
subserved the idea of source conception as the norm. The fact that every departure
from the source vieW required a special enactment confirmed the applicability
of the source view of income. Further, the legislature abstained from enacting a
(a) any capital asset self -generated in the course of business;
(b) any intangible capital asset in the nature of;
(i) goodwill of a business;
(i) a trade mark or brand name associated with the business;
(iii) a right to manufacture or produce any article or thing;
(iv) right to carry on any business;
(v) tenancy right in respect of premises occupied by the assessee and used by him for
the purposes of his business, or
(vi) licence, right or permit (by whatever name called) acquired in connection with,
or in the course of, any business;
(c) any tangible capital asset in the nature of a building, machinery, plant or furniture, or
(d) any other capital asset connected with or used for the purposes of any business of the
assessee.

145 § 245 (151), The Direct Tax Code, 2010 defines 'investment asset' as any capital asset,
which is not a business capital asset.
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sweeping amendment that would define income from the net accretion perspective.
Nor did it issue a policy statement confirming its commitment to the net accretion
perspective of income, Inferably, this was because India's fiscal policy itself was
only in transition from the source view.
Consequently, this paper attributes the incoherence in India's concept of
taxable income to the growing disconnect between the fiscal policy's view of income
and the judiciary's view of income. The following are some closing thoughts on
attributing responsibility for this incoherence.
One view is that economic policy must be clearly reflected in legislation.
The Courts may only interpret the law as it exists. Given the transitioning fiscal
policy and the vague definition of income, the judiciary had little choice but to
seek support from precedent.
An alternative view could argue on the impossibility of defining a concept
such as income in the law. Income tax law does not exist in a vacuum. Its object is
the implementation of a fiscal system. Consider the following passage:
"the legal concept of income is not something that can ultimately be defined
by law because it is not something that exists eitheras a physicalfact or as an
abstractthought ...
[O]ne cannot identify the bordersof the concept because,
at its borders, income is a fiction, invented for the purposes of income tax
legislation, that does not have independent existence in the world physical
fact or abstractthought.""
Consequently, the judiciary must keep pace with fiscal policy and further the
economic conception of income. Consider R.M. Haig's comments on this subject
147
in the context of the U.S. Supreme Court's decision in Eisnerv. Macomber :
"if the legal concept established by court interpretation.. .departs
in any fundamental fashion from the economic concept, injustices
may arise of such magnitude as to necessitate an abandonment of
the income tax..."14
146 John Prebble, Philosophical and Design Problems that Arise From the Ectopic Nature of
Income Tax Law and Teir Impat on the Taxation ofInternational Trade and Investment, 13
CHINESE YsEASoos or INTERNATIONAL LAW ANi AFFAItS, 111 (1995) as quoted in 174,
K. Holmes.
147 Eisner v. Macomber, 252 U.S. 189 (1920) [Supreme Court of the United States]. The case
centred on the issue of the taxability of stock dividends. The Supreme Court declared
that realization was essential to the concept of income. Haig advocated the net accretion
perspective of income and viewed realization as an unnecessary qualification to the
concept of income.
148 15, R.M. Haig.

